TEHRAN — Brigadier General Ramezan Sharif, head of the Islamic Revolution Guard Corps (IRGC) Sacred Defense Documents Center and an adviser to the IRGC commander-in-chief, has described Iran’s ability to restrict or block maritime traffic through the Strait of Hormuz as a strategic and deterrent instrument of national power.

Speaking at a ceremony commemorating the Iranian forces and commanders, martyred during the 1980–1988 Iran-Iraq war, Sharif highlighted the role of the late IRGC Navy commander Alireza Tangsiri in shaping Iran’s approach to the strategically vital waterway.

According to Sharif, the development of Iran’s ability to control the Strait marked a turning point in the way Hormuz was incorporated into the region’s strategic and military equations. He characterized the capability as a “strategic and deterrent weapon” available to the Islamic Republic.

Sharif said the experience of Iranian forces in the Strait during the Sacred Defense had demonstrated how control of a strategically important maritime passage could influence broader military calculations. He also argued that Iran’s experience in the waterway had subsequently served as a model for the “Resistance Front.”

Hormuz as a pillar of Iran’s maritime strategy

Sharif’s remarks come as the Strait of Hormuz remains at the center of an escalating confrontation involving Iran, the United States and regional actors. The waterway, which separates Iran from Oman and links the Persian Gulf with the Gulf of Oman and the Arabian Sea, is one of the world’s most important energy chokepoints.

The US Energy Information Administration estimates that 20.9 million barrels per day of oil passed through the Strait in the first half of 2025, equivalent to roughly 20% of global petroleum liquids consumption. Because alternative routes have limited capacity, any sustained disruption to shipping through Hormuz can have immediate consequences for global energy markets.

The strategic importance of the waterway has become even more pronounced amid the current conflict. The EIA estimates that oil and petroleum-liquid flows through Hormuz averaged only 4.9 million barrels per day in the second quarter of 2026, compared with 21.6 million barrels per day in the final quarter of 2025, before the conflict began. The disruption has contributed to significant volatility in global crude markets.

From Tehran’s perspective, the Strait is therefore not merely a commercial shipping route but also a key component of Iran’s asymmetric deterrence strategy. Iranian officials have repeatedly argued that the country’s geographic position along the northern shore of the waterway gives it significant leverage in any military confrontation in the Persian Gulf.

Sharif’s reference to Tangsiri also carries particular significance. Tangsiri, who commanded the IRGC Navy from 2018 until his martyrdom in March 2026, became closely associated with Iran’s maritime strategy and its emphasis on asymmetric capabilities, including fast attack craft, missiles, drones and other systems designed to complicate the operations of technologically superior naval forces.

Iranian officials have long maintained that the country does not seek to close Hormuz under normal circumstances, but that it retains the capability to restrict maritime traffic if confronted with 'a major security threat.' In this framework, the ability to disrupt the waterway is presented primarily as a deterrent capability—one intended to raise the potential cost of military action against Iran rather than simply as an instrument for shutting down global energy supplies.

That strategic calculation gives Hormuz a significance extending well beyond the Persian Gulf. Any prolonged disruption would affect not only Iran and the Arab Gulf states but also major Asian energy consumers, including China, India, Japan and South Korea, which account for a substantial share of the crude and condensate transported through the waterway. 

Sharif’s comments consequently reflect a longstanding Iranian military doctrine: control of the country’s surrounding maritime geography can compensate, at least in part, for conventional disparities with larger military powers and create a form of strategic deterrence based on geography, mobility and the ability to impose costs on an adversary.

Against the backdrop of the current confrontation, Tehran’s emphasis on Hormuz also signals that the waterway remains central to Iran’s calculations of national security and regional power.